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- 
The paper describes that; economic expansion depends on the states interventions that 
create a favorable environment and direct economic activity toward greater investment. 
To hold this argument, Supportive evidence will be presented focusing on the policy of 
strong state intervention practiced in the newly industrialized countries (NICs) in 
general and the Korean experience in particular. It also assesses the problems of the 
neoliberal prescriptions fostered by the World Bank/IMF which currently 
encouraged/pressured many under developed economies especially sub-Saharan Africa 
including Ethiopia to undertake structural adjustment program (SAPs) measures based 
on the experience of the NICs, in this case, the analysis will argue that these institutions 
have ignored the recognized activist role of the state in the transformation of the NICs 
and preclude the lessons to be learned. Consequently, the paper will contend that, for 
under developed economy like sub Saharan Africa, a highly motivated and development 
oriented activist state is indispensable to direct, promote and facilitate the economy in 
order to bring structural transformation and allow entering in the global economic 
competition. Finally, the paper draws lessons for Ethiopia suggesting some important 
considerations need to be taken in formulating broad based development strategy. 
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Preface 
 
The paper describes that; economic expansion depends on the states interventions that 
create a favorable environment and direct economic activity toward greater investment. 
To hold this argument, Supportive evidence will be presented focusing on the policy of 
strong state intervention practiced in the newly industrialized countries (NICs) in general 
and the Korean experience in particular. It also assesses the problems of the neoliberal 
prescriptions fostered by the World Bank/IMF which currently encouraged/pressured 
many under developed economies especially sub-Saharan Africa including Ethiopia to 
undertake structural adjustment program (SAPs) measures based on the experience of the 
NICs, in this case, the analysis will argue that these institutions have ignored the 
impediments to structural transformation under SAPs in these countries. The fact that, 
these countries are characterized by backward economy, existing in a stage of factor-
driven development and underdevelopment, having low level of technological capacities, 
getting market indicators and macroeconomic fundamentals right will not be enough, a 
highly motivated and development oriented activist state is indispensable to direct, 
promote and facilitate the economy in order to bring transformation and allow entering in 
the global economic competition. Finally, the paper draws lessons for Ethiopia 
suggesting some important considerations need to be taken in formulating broad based 
development strategy. 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction  
Much of the existing literature on economic performance in East Asia and sub Saharan 
Africa (SSA) countries shows that East Asia and SSAs, in the 1950s, 1060s, and 1970s, 
the income levels were similar. Only in the 1980s and 1990s there is an enormous gap 
evolving, because East Asia grew very fast and (SSA) stagnated (1). SSAs have been 
recognized as the worst performers of the developing world, the growth has not only been 
the slowest of all regions in the world since 1960 but it has also attained negative per 
capita values in many countries over the period 1965-90 (Easterly and Levin 1995; 2).  
Ethiopia as the group of SSA country has also been one of the poor performers in this 
regard. Agriculture is the backbone of the economy. It accounts for about 50% of the 
GDP, more than 90 % of the foreign export earnings and engages over 85%of the 
population. Manufacturing forms only a minor part of the Ethiopian economy. As a result, 
the turn of the millennium finds Ethiopia, one of the oldest continuous civilizations in the 
world, as one of the most destitute of nations, in all possible dimensions (2).  
In explaining the major reason for the phenomenal success of the East Asian countries, 
various schools of thoughts have interpreted in different ways. One of the prominent 
views in this area, which occupied the main stream of the economics profession, is the 
neoclassical school. They like to treat the market system as the major reason for the 
high-speed development. The failure of them However is that they never pay attention 
to the active role of the state for which it disregards the comprehensive intervention 
practices promoted in the economic development process of the NICs.  
The first purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that the state played crucial role in the 
development of the NICs; indeed the practical experience provides supportive evidence.  
To me, East Asia, in this particular reference the Korean case; the strong role of 
government is the major reason for the success and the unprecedented industrialisation 
results achieved with in a mere three decades. 
This paper mainly uses Korean development experience as a reference. The reasons 
why I focus on the experiences of Korea is that, Korea before the 1960s had a backward 
economy based on subsistence agriculture with all the difficulties facing a typical less 
under developed countries especially for most sub Saharan Africa including Ethiopia 
today. 
Korean per capita income in the early 1960s was $82. Besides, South Korea was barely 
recovering from the ruins of the Korean War, which had left 45% of the factories 
substantially damaged.i With such a low-level income, domestic savings were negligible. 
The population growth of nearly 3% a year in an already densely populated country 
meant that the country had to depend on foreign aid for sheer survival. Unemployment, 
underemployment and poverty were widespread with over 40% of the nation’s 
population suffering from absolute poverty. Nevertheless, Ethiopia even other SSAs 
have lost ground, and still marginalized with respect to other regions of the NICs with 
equal and even less promising starting conditions in the early 1960s. For example the 
per capita income of Korea in the early 1960s was lower than those of Haiti, Ethiopia, 
and Yemen and about 40% below India’s. Moreover, in describing this phenomenal 
economic transformation, "The Economist" June, 1997, noted that in just three decades, 
South Korea catapulted itself from a level of economic development no higher than that 
of Ghana in the early 1960's.  
How ever, from a position uncomfortably close to the bottom of the international income 
scale and with out the benefit of significant natural resources,  
Korea embarked on a course of industrial growth with in three decades that become one 
of the outstanding success stories in international development. Korea is now an 
industrial, modern state providing a classic example where the policy of strong 
government has been successful for which it established Korea as the eleventh largest 
economy in the world. 
Meanwhile, following an ideology known as neoliberalism, and spearheaded by the 
international financial institutions, Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) have been 
imposed in developing countries. They argue for a minimalist state under the fabric of 
structural adjustment programs (SAPs) and good governance. These institutions 
promoted this approach as a means of reducing poverty worldwide especially this has 
held sway in Africa since the 1980s. SAPs are designed to foster through privatization 
state owned and operated enterprises, liberalisation, removal of government subsidies, 
deregulation, outward orientation, export promotion and so on.  
The truth of the matter is that there is a respectable and accumulating body of opinion 
and evidence to challenge the theoretical and empirical adequacy of neo- liberal 
prescriptions as manaceas for the development problem.   
In this respect the second argument to be made here is that the issue as to whether the 
state should play an active or a passive role in the economy is not as closed, as 
proponents of SAPs would have it, the issue remains an open one and as such it is best 
to suspend the dogmatism about SAPs, and it is incumbent for underdeveloped 
economy like SSAs to vigorously debate the relative merits of government intervention 
in the economy. In this regard I contend that the way beyond SAPs is through an 
activist state, guiding, and governing the market toward economic development.  
As shall be described later, it is my contention that the fundamental weakness of SAPs 
is their inability to accommodate and properly inform on an activist and dirigist role of 
the state to govern and guide the market toward the attainment of the goal of economic 
development. 
 To deal with these issues, the structure of the paper will be as follows. The following 
section reviews the literature on the role of government in the economic development of 
East Asia. In this section the explanation of the East Asian miracle focusing on the 
criticism of the neoliberal Model and the Arguments in Favour of Government 
Intervention will be discussed.  
Section three describes the major policy tools the Korean government used in promoting 
speedy economic development correspondingly; other initial conditions and political 
factors that contribute to the economic growth will be reviewed. In section four, SAPs 
will be assessed first in relation to the goal of economic development. Then, It assesses 
the problem of the neo liberal prescription and the need for an activist state beyond these 
prescriptions. The last section draws the possible lesson for Ethiopia and concludes by 
suggesting some important considerations need to be taken in formulating broad based 
development strategy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
II. Literature review on the role of the state in the economic 
development of East Asia 
 Since late 1950s, East Asia’s economic development has become a new phenomenon in 
the global economy. In a short period of time, East Asian economies, whether a war 
defeated like Japan or with low starting point like South Korea developed with 
unprecedented rate in which they became a leading economic power (Japan) or newly 
industrialized economies like Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan. 
This remarkable performance of the East Asian economy has inspired many economists 
to study the background of the rapid growth and various streams of literature have 
emerged to assess the reasons of the astonishing growth. Interestingly, different 
economists interpret this success in entirely different ways. There are those who hold 
that East Asian economic success is ascribed to economic openness, as advocated by the 
market mechanism, neo classical economics approach.  
Other interpreters challenged the studies by neoclassical economists by focusing on the 
active role played by the state in leading the process of economic development among 
latecomer developing nations. Ranged against them, in varied degree of opposition, are 
a number of other views. Some emphasize on the socio cultural factors, other highlight 
on external factors, which is linked to western defense against communism and some 
others, underline on the emergence of entrepreneurs and institutional factors.  
This section reviews the explanation of the East Asian miracle focusing on the Criticism 
of the Neoliberal model and the arguments in favor of government Intervention, it 
presents the theoretical, empirical and historical evidences that shows the policy of 
strong government intervention has been successful. 
To start with, beginning from the 1980s a new neo-liberalism seems to have taken over 
which sought, a-historically, to correlate the absence of market distortions with 
allocative efficiency and economic growth. What is generally advocated in this neo-
liberalism is export-orientation as against import-substitution, trade liberalization, 
limiting government activity in the realm of development to the provision of general 
infrastructure for growth, such as law and order, general education, maintenance of a 
favourable macro-economic environment, and providing for "rare" market failures 
through "neutral" policy measures, massive commercialization and privatisation of state 
enterprises, and major reforms in the government bureaucracy.” Governments have no 
business being in business". Free trade and factor mobility reduces rent-seeking by 
restraining the interest and preventing cartels from forming. 
The failure of government intervention and the positive contributions of the market 
mechanism were elaborately discussed in studies by, among others, Balassa (1977), 
Corbo et al. (1985), Hughes et al. (1988), Krueger (1978), Little, Scitovsky, and Scott 
(1970), and Michaely et al. (1987). These studies considered the East Asian countries as 
examples of countries where the market mechanism had positively influenced the 
process of economic development. More specifically, to quote for example,  (Balassa, 
1971; Little et al., 1970) have stated that reliance on market forces and the adoption of 
market-driven export-oriented development strategies was said to have led to efficient 
exploitation of the comparative advantage of these countries in cheap labour. 
Foremost in the exercise of denial of a positive role for the state in industrial 
development is the World Bank/IMF especially in their attempt to force the evidence 
from the high performing East Asian countries into its neo-classical mold of "getting the 
prices right.  
Here, it must be recognized that the wrong kind of government intervention or economic 
statism can also be highly detrimental as it may generate its own problems. A most telling 
testimony against state intervention is the dismal results that were achieved by most 
developing countries which practiced extensive state intervention.  However, this did not 
automatically mean that the neoliberal alternative provided a correct interpretation of the 
backgrounds of the successes in East Asia (Wade, 1991). Besides, the problem with the 
dogmatic proponents of neoliberals is that in their insistence to castigate state 
intervention and safeguard against the resort to the failed past import substitution or 
socialist strategies which have been one form of government intervention, they have gone 
to the other extreme ignoring the recognized active and dirigist role of the state in the 
development of the NICs. This easily manipulable base for comparison simply does not 
exist. 
The first presentation for African consumption of the lessons from Asia from the neo-
liberal perspective was the "Berg report" (World Bank, 1981), which has been the 
definitive document on adjustment for 17 years. There have been amendments, 
subtractions, additions and refinements of the argument, but as Adjustment in Africa 
(World Bank, 1994) clearly suggested, the World Bank was almost congenitally tied to 
the core argument of the Berg report with its faith in the market and a minimalist view 
of the state.  
However, the truth of the matter is that there is a respectable and accumulating body of 
opinion and evidence to challenge the theoretical and empirical adequacy of neo- liberal 
view. 
The theoretical basis for state interventions has been justified by development 
theoretists since the decade of the 1950 and 1960's. They held the idea of 
"Structuralism" as a conviction in common.  
According to the idea, the essential economic structure of LDC is different from that of 
developed country (DC), and the economic gap, industrial gap and life level gap seemed 
to increase. Thus, they found the main question of development study in exploring the 
reason of poverty and the method to escape from it. Most scholars in this field saw 
economic development as a dynamic process of non-marginal change. The process was 
characterised by large investments, increasing returns to scale, the pervasiveness of 
externalities, market imperfections and failures. Most development theorists saw change 
as neither smooth nor automatic, and argued convincingly that although the price 
mechanism provided adequate signals for marginal changes; it could not be relied upon 
to induce dynamic resource allocation necessary for industrialization. This provided the 
theoretical basis for state interventions required either to support investors or to invest 
directly "to break critical bottlenecks" resulting from market failures.  
According to the development theorists argument, the omission of the state as an 
explicit actor is a fundamental flaw since they relied on the state as an agent of change 
and presumed that it had the requisite political autonomy and administrative tools to 
carry out the task. In the presence of widespread market failure, the superior capacity of 
government functionaries to allocate resources became an article of faith. The state's 
ability to undertake sectoral targeting and its fiscal capacity for direct intervention were 
taken for granted.  
The historical evidences also show that, most industrialized countries' governments 
intervened and continue to chart the course and pace of industrial development either by 
default or design. The US, Japan, Germany, Italy and lately South Korea, Taiwan and 
China intervened and continue to intervene massively to accelerate the pace and 
structure of industrial development through industrial policy, direct state ownership and 
other non-market mechanisms.  
Certainly, any other regions than the East Asian economies demonstrate such high 
development performance and the greater part of countries holds government with 
strong leadership.  
Subsequent empirical analysis has also shown that neo-classical reading of experiences 
of development in Asia has been tendentious, deliberately downplaying the role of the 
state in the "success stories". "Revisionist" literature on the Asian experience presents a 
picture quite different from that projected by neo-classical interpretation of that same 
experience. These countries were far from paragons of laissez-fairism and, instead, were 
highly "dirigiste" economies in which the states had "governed markets" to ensure high 
levels of accumulation, technology absorption and conquest of foreign markets. The 
general conclusion of this literature is that "market failure" so prominent in 
development economics is still a problem that warrants government intervention and 
that since such "failures" differ in intensity, scope and location, a selective set of 
interventions is required.  
The most significant lesson has been the central role played by a "developmental state" 
in the process of development. Several researchers like Kwon (1994), Lall (1994), 
Perkins (1994), Amsden (1994) have publicized that East Asian countries have 
intervened massively with unprecedented industrialisation results and have shown the 
weakness of the neoliberal attempt. To quote Kwon (1994), the East Asian miracle 
report of the World Bank (on Japan, Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, 
Malaysia, Taiwan, Thailand and Indonesia). " makes an all-out effort to assert that the 
East Asian economic success has nothing to do with government. If government is to 
deserve any credit it only does so because it’s various forms of interventions (in pricing, 
interest rates, wages, bank credit, monetary and fiscal policy, protection of domestic 
industries, export promotion and subsidies and industrial policies and so forth) must 
have by some magical coincidence, jelled into a neoclassical formulation (The Bank) 
blatantly ignores a significant body of literature counter-factual to its evidence," (pp 
635-636). Lall (1994) calls it "a flawed work p. 646" for similar reasons.  
More over, the comprehensive research by the developmental statist political 
economists in explaining the economic success of the Asia’s newly industrialized 
economies, have shown unambiguously the unconvincing arguments posed by the 
mainstream neo classical economists schools. They clearly indicated that East Asian 
economies, which embrace "strong government", have achieved conspicuous 
development ironically.  
The Japanese study by Johnson (1982), the study of Korean rapid economic 
development by Amsden (1989) and also the report of Taiwan market by Wade (1990) 
have emphasised the significant role of government in industrialisation period.  
Each of them is targeting separate regions, but has a common message, i.e., each 
government substitutes the infant market function and it is thought to be the element of 
successful development.  
This, at the same time, denies the argument of government failure by neoclassical view, 
and development state view demonstrates evident case in which government can push 
development actively. Moreover, the discussion by Amsden (1989) that government 
intervention distorting immature market function itself has been the significant, 
criticised sharply to the myth of free trade market. She insists that Korean government 
intervened by getting price wrong to stimulate export industry, then, it succeeded to 
economic development through accelerated export. This argument is completely 
opposed to the conclusion of Balassa (1990) that focused on the policy change from 
import substitution to export orrientation with "getting price right ".  
Unfortunately, neo-classical economists seem to refuse to admit these theoretical, 
historical and empirical facts. In attacking state intervention they "posit an idealized 
market instead. However, in recent periods the staff of the World Bank touched the role 
of government and recognized that active government involvement effectively worked in 
the East Asian miracle. According to the world bank report in 1991, following four 
factors have to be satisfied by government: (1) the investment to elementary education, 
public hygiene or family planning to improve human capital, (2) deregulation and 
maintenance of infrastructure to promote the competition in private sector, (3) the open 
policy by import protection abolishment or mitigation of FDI, and (4) macro economic 
stability. These policies are named as fundamental policy. The market friendly approach 
implies that the government involvement should not make any special treatment to 
individual enterprise or industry, but improve the framework of whole market. Hence, 
this approach has avoided that government runs enterprises or promotes specific industry 
by protections and regulations. However, recent criticism by Ha-Joon Chang, 2003, 
highlights the failure of neoliberalism, especially in developing countries, or what he 
terms “the intellectual bankrapcy”, which he believes, “stems ultimately from its failure 
to base its discourse on a balanced and sophisticated theory of the interrelation ship 
between the market, the state, and other institutions”. 
At this point of discussion, it is imperative to note that although there is a growing 
consensus that governments can play a vital role in successful development efforts, the 
proponents of the developmental state failed to address the question of why the state 
intervened in the way it did or problematic consequences of such intervention. In his 
paper “Recasting Korean Dirigisme”, by focusing on the case of Korea, Park, Hun-Joo 
clearly counters the developmental state arguments by elucidating the political nexus of 
power, and how state power holders used their position to direct development and 
divide the benefits in an imbalanced manner, with the majority of the benefits accruing 
to a certain few chosen as proxies in business to carry out the orders of the power holder. 
Furthermore, Park asserted the lack of people centeredness which he termed “diseased 
dirigisme” as the fundamental flaw in Korea’s militaristic growth at any cost 
modernization campaign.     
Thus, it should be noted that the problem with a dirigist state in under developed 
economies is best appreciated by considering the meaning and implications of economic 
development as a goal. The process entails economic growth, structural transformation 
and increases in economic welfare and some minimum degree of equity, at least. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
III. The role of the state in the economic development of Korea 
The idea of a government intervening in the process of economic growth was appealing 
to many politicians. It contributed to developing models of central planning, and it 
stimulated to using trade policies, such as import quota, export subsidies, and fixed 
exchange rates, introducing price controls and subsidies in markets for goods and 
production factors, and establishing public enterprises in important sectors like mining 
and heavy industries. Many governments pursued policies of import substitution (and 
later also export promotion). A good example for this is the Korean experience that 
proved to be successful in achieving economic growth by way of government 
intervention 
The remainder of this section will discuss in more detail several of the above-mentioned 
aspects of the NICs intervention policy focusing on the Korean experience, such as the 
characteristics of industrial policies, the instruments that were used to stimulate specific 
investments, the institutional context, and the preconditions. 
1.  Korean intervention policy 
        1.1 Industrial development policy 
In 12 January 1973, President Park Chung Hee announced his intention to launch the 
HII Plan. According to the HCI Plan, six industries were designated as “key” industries 
to be promoted: steel, nonferrous metal, machinery (including automobile), shipbuilding, 
electronics, and chemical 7. Separate from these six industries, five projects were 
already under way, with strong government support, to develop special steel, brass, 
foundry heavy machinery, and shipbuilding (Hyundai) plants. 
Most of the industries were designed to develop as future leading export industries, 
whose share in commodity exports was expected to exceed 50 percent by 1980 (13).  
The government mobilized domestic capital by encouraging savings, determined what 
kinds of plants could be constructed with these funds, and reviewed the potential of the 
products for export. In this sense, the will of the government to undertake economic 
development played a crucial role; the role of the government, however, was not limited 
to such measures as mobilizing capital and allocating investments. The Economic 
Planning Board established export targets that, if met, yielded additional government-
subsidized credit and further access to the growing domestic market.  
The government especially stimulated those industries that were thought to be of crucial 
importance to the long-term development of South Korea. Whereas in the 1960s mainly 
export-oriented industries were stimulated, in the 1970s emphasis was placed on the 
development of heavy and chemical industries, the electronics industry, and 
shipbuilding. In the 1980s the centre of attention of industrial policies shifted towards 
stimulating the development of high-quality industries. As a consequence, due to 
government intervention South Korea became a leading producer of microchips, and 
had an important share in the world markets for consumer electronics, cars, and in 
shipbuilding. The relatively long time these industries require to reach maturity, and the 
limited profitability (or even temporary loss) during the initial phase cause these 
industries to be rather unattractive when it comes to private investment. This provides a 
justifiable reason for an active industrial policy by the government. 
1.2 Tools of government intervention 
The Korean government used various instruments that enabled to influence the 
organization of production decisions and the allocation of production factors; in order to 
achieve those scarce resources would be applied in the areas they preferred.  
These instruments primarily aim at creating rents, instrument i.e. providing subsidies for 
certain investments. Initially, subsidies were granted by means of programmes for 
cheap credit and selective credit loans.  
In Korea, the government had a significant impact on determining the nominal deposit 
and loan rate in the 1960s and 1970s. Moreover, Korea introduced guidelines with 
respect to the allocation of bank loans to the private sector. Thus, they were able to 
stimulate the development of specific industries and private activities by granting them 
access to external funding and by subsidizing this funding. Furthermore, instruments 
like tax advantages, selective granting of available foreign currencies, and the 
stimulation of cartels were used to positively influence the investment behavior of the 
private sector. Finally, in certain specific cases, like for example the case of the South 
Korean shipbuilding industry, the government explicitly guaranteed that possible 
unprofitable investment decisions would be compensated for. Rodrik 1994, refers to this 
as "...the socialization of investment risk in selected sectors."  
Apart from granting subsidies in order to stimulate certain types of investment, in 
several cases governments were actively involved in taking specific investment 
decisions aiming at improving the coordination and cooperation between different 
projects present several examples that show that the governments of South Korea and 
Taiwan the decisions in order to develop certain new industrial activities and 
subsequently supervised and participated in the implementation of these activities. 
1.3 The role of the export promotion policy 
Korea in the 1950s, more than two-thirds of its population engaged in the primary 
sector, possessed all the familiar characteristics of an extremely underdeveloped 
economy.   
With an energetic execution of export-oriented growth strategy since the early 1960s, 
however, the growth rate of the Korean economy jumped from about 4 percent per 
annum on average in 1953-61 to about 8 percent in 1962-66 and to about 9 percent in 
1967-88.  
The proportion of persons employed in primary sector declined from about 64 percent 
of total employed persons in 1963 to about 20 percent in 1988, while that in 
manufacturing sector expanded from about 8 percent to 27 percent.  
Some new interventionists stressed the fact that government intervention stimulated 
especially those export industries for which competition in international markets was 
fierce, in order to stimulate the building up of a competitive external sector. Moreover, 
they put much more weight into the role of government intervention to develop such a 
competitive external sector. They argue that international competition can be regarded 
as an efficiency check of interventionist policies and the policy measures used. The 
success or failure of export producing firms provided the government with information, 
which enabled it to decide whether or not to continue support to particular industries, 
and to decide on the extent of this support.  
Thus, protection measures and the granting of subsidies were linked to the performance 
of firms with regard to the development of sales in foreign markets. 
 1.4 Government business relations 
Several studies have examined the question concerning the way governments were able 
to dispose of sufficient information to efficiently coordinate investment decisions and to 
determine which industries were important in realizing a dynamically efficient 
allocation of scarce resources. These studies show that very close ties existed between 
the government, banks, and the private sector.  
These ties led to frequent contacts between the government and the private sector about 
the economy’s weaknesses and strengths. In this way, the government gained a better 
understanding of the nature of the coordination problems that played a role in the 
economy. On the basis of this information the government was better able to take 
decisions concerning intervention. 
In South Korea, civil servants from different ministries, bank managers, and managers 
of large companies regularly met on so-called deliberation councils.  
Apart from this there were also monthly export meetings. At these meetings, presided 
by the president of the country and attended by senior civil servants, managers of banks 
and companies, economic bottlenecks were directly discussed, and decisions were taken 
concerning the outlines of the industrial, trade, and financial policies. Specific attention 
would be paid to the performance of the export industries, and if necessary the export 
policy would be adjusted on the basis of the information available. 
2. Other Initial conditions and political factors  
  2.1 initial conditions  
The new interventionists emphasise that in these countries the educational system and 
the level of education of the labour force were of a relatively high standard as early as 
the 1950s, especially compared to countries in Latin America and Africa. This positive 
initial condition had various positive consequences.  
To start with, this meant that labour productivity was relatively high and that the East 
Asian economies were at least capable of working with relatively high-grade production 
processes as early as the 1950s. Moreover, this meant that the copying of Western 
technologies - which according to Amsden is the essence of late industrialisation - could 
be executed faster. Finally, the high level of education had a positive effect on the 
quality of the civil service. 
The latter was not to be underestimated as an aspect of the success of the East Asian 
intervention policy. Several authors have therefore paid special attention to the aspect of 
the quality of the civil service. An efficient apparatus of government was of great 
importance in order to translate the information on coordination problems in the 
economy into a policy that could contribute to increasing economic growth. Moreover, 
the work ethic of the average civil servant in the Eastern Asian countries was also 
important in explaining the efficiency of government intervention.  
In many developing countries civil servants seemed to be easily corrupted, whereas in 
most East Asian countries this was relatively less common. Consequently, the abuse of, 
for example, the granting of subsidies and other benefits to firms could be kept rather 
limited. To explain this phenomenon the new interventionists argued, among other 
things, that in such countries as South Korea and Taiwan a high degree of social 
responsibility had been developed and introduced through the educational system. 
Education very much contributed to a sense of social awareness. This led to the fact that 
a position as a civil servant involved a high social status. This may be an explanation 
for the fact that the best students often accepted a position with the government whereas 
a similar position in the private sector would pay far more. This high status would also 
contribute to a lower degree of corruptness as compared to that in many other 
developing countries. Moreover, a career with the civil service was considered the 
perfect way to a high position in the private sector later (see e.g. Wade, 1991; and 
World Bank, 1993). 
5.2 political factors 
Apart from these initial conditions, several authors argue that the political economic 
circumstances in the East Asian countries contributed to the fact that government 
intervention could concentrate on the efficient use of scarce resources.  
As is well-known from the public-choice literature, a government may implement a 
policy because they are being pressurised by certain groups in society that are crucial to 
a possible re-election. In such case, in their policy the government may to a certain 
extent want to comply with the wishes of their future voters, rather than pursue a policy 
that contributes to economic growth as much as possible. For example, they may not 
use subsidies to support certain important economic activities; instead subsidies may be 
used to secure political support.  
In many Latin American and African countries such a populist policy has been pursued 
in the past with all the associated negative consequences to general economic growth. In 
case of a more autocratic government, the government will use part of the means 
available to bribe representatives of powerful lobbies who could put at risk the 
government’s continuity or to forcefully suppress these lobbies. 
In South Korea and Taiwan the government hardly ever faced lobbies of real 
importance so that a populist policy was not necessary. Therefore, they could develop 
and pursue their policies independent of any lobby and they could efficiently employ 
subsidies and other instruments to promote economic growth, rather than use them in 
order to gain political support (see, among others, Haggard, 1990; and Rodrik, 1994). 
There were several different reasons for this particular circumstance, according to the 
new interventionists. Schuknecht (1996), among others, for an empirical analysis of 
such kind of political economic processes, countries like South Korea and Taiwan were 
characterised by a relatively equal income distribution (Rodrik, 1994) due to which the 
governments of these countries were less pressurized into taking popular measures to 
please certain lobbies. The equal income distribution was mainly the result of the land 
reforms of the 1950s, which took place both in South Korea and Taiwan. Thus, equal 
income distribution had been realised before the start of the period of rapid growth.  
More recently, empirical support for the positive relation between equal income 
distribution and economic growth has been found (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; and 
Persson and Tabellini, 1994). 
Moreover, some mention the fact that both the South Korean and the Taiwanese society 
were characterised by a relatively cultural unity (Wade, 1991). This meant that this 
potential source of political instability was less strong than it often was in other 
developing countries, and that this made it easier to develop a solid nation state.  
Some authors also mention the fact that the Japanese oppression of South Korea before 
1945 drastically reduced the role of lobbies in this country.   
To conclude this section, the growing amount of research on the experience of Korean 
rapid development showed that government could indeed contribute positively to 
growth by means of comprehensive intervention in the economic development process. 
In this regard, the Korean case is an evidence for the proposition that economic 
expansion depends on the states interventions that create a favorable environment and 
direct economic activity toward greater investment. 
IV. The role of the state beyond the neoliberal prescription  
       1. Impediments to structural transformation under SAPs 
The main features of SAPs are decentralization of administrative regions, an institution 
of free trade policies, capital market liberalization, privatization of state owned and 
operated enterprises, removal of government subsidies, and other austerity measures 
such as increased taxation, currency devaluation to increase exports, institution of high 
interest rates, and an increase in export production. 
The Problem with current structural adjustment programmes especially in Africa is that 
their basis is to initially re-entrench and reconsolidate the economies in the factordriven 
stage with no clear indication as to how that will lead to the transition toward the 
investment-driven stage.  
The most immediate expectation of SAPs is to stimulate traditional exports, all of which, 
in Africa are tied to natural factor endowment competitive advantage. They are, in the 
medium to long term, also expected, however, to stimulate non-traditional exports, 
efficient import-substitution of tradeables, and production of non-tradeables such as 
housing and buildings. The most general effect of SAPs has been to induce a stag- 
flationary situation in which traditional exports may increase but nothing else happens, 
except perhaps a marginal degree of resuscitation.  
Under such circumstances, SAP measures might generate some degree of economic 
growth based on the growth of traditional exports but may not even begin to initiate 
processes toward economic development based on the growth of indigenised 
technological clusters and capacities. 
Briefly, some of the impediments to structural transformation under SAPs are as follows: 
1. SAPs reinforce traditional forms of comparative advantage that have insignificant spill 
over effects in terms of the development of national technological capacity (NTC), 
sectoral technological capacity (STC), or industry technological capacity (ITC); 
2. SAPs have the effect of hastening de-industrialisation and the general closure of firms 
that cannot survive in the new environment at a faster pace than new firms can develop to 
take advantage of the new policy environment. 
SAPs have largely been predicated on attracting foreign investment which has not been 
forthcoming because not only are investors unsure about the government's commitment 
to the market-oriented policies compatible with the needs of globalised monopoly capital, 
but the absence of conducive technological clusters and capacities has been a hinderance. 
When the latter's absence has not been a hindrance, foreign investment has come in on 
the basis of turn-key investments linked to external technological clusters exploiting 
export incentives without cumulative technological capacity building spill-overs; 
3. Implicit in SAPs is the assumption that technological capacity is a tradeable which can 
be imported, and yet in many respects, since technological capacity, consists of the 
evolution of critical minimum thresholds and configurations of geographically 
concentrated clusters which make it a non-tradeable non-importable factor of 
development, even if individual components may be imported. Further, as such, it is not 
attained solely on the basis of incremental piecemeal changes in investment, trade and 
production; 
4. The domestic private sector has been saddled with high input costs, inadequate capital, 
skilled manpower shortages, inadequate infrastructure, inability to access modern 
technology relevant to competition in the new global environment and an absence of 
infrastructure to penetrate non-traditional foreign markets, thus making the private sector 
unable to seize upon the new policy environment as a basis for domestic and international 
competitive advantage, and, finally; 
5, the inability of such countries to control the stag- flationary consequences, let alone, 
the social consequences, of SAP-related policies has dampened business expectations and 
optimism thereby discouraging domestic private investment of a long term nature. 
2.2 The need for an activist state   
The problem with SAPs and the need for a dirigist state in a factor driven economies is 
best appreciated by considering the meaning and implications of economic development 
as a goal. Economic development is the economic process whereby a country achieves 
sustainable increases in the per capita gross domestic product of its citizens through the 
efficient use of its productive capacities and resources. The process entails economic 
growth, structural transformation and increases in economic welfare and some 
minimum degree of equity, at least. The crucial qualitative criterion is the ability of the 
economy to evolve economic structures that are articulated through vertical and lateral 
linkages, that are diversified enough to absorb internal and external shocks, and that 
interact in a mutually supportive manner to internally generate and sustain secular 
economic growth in the long term. 
Consequently, in the absence of indigenised technological clusters and capacities, 
inadequate capital, skilled manpower shortages, inadequate infrastructure, inability to 
access modern technology relevant to competition in the new global environment and 
an absence of infrastructure to penetrate non-traditional foreign markets, relying on the 
private sector as the presumed engine of growth, while simultaneously trimming the 
state of its potential role in guiding and directing the economy, are a sure recipe for 
stagnation and being stuck in the factor-driven stage. 
One of the most outspoken critics of the globalization process and SAPs has been 
Joseph Stiglitz, according to him the most successful economies achieved their 
accomplishments by following a course opposite the one being proposed for the 
countries of the developing world. The G7 countries as well as most successful Asian 
economies never adopted these rules during their rise to economic prosperity. For 
example, the Asian Miracle of the past three decades that has put countries like China, 
South Korea, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia at the economic forefront was achieved 
precisely because these countries avoided adopting IMF prescriptions in the form of 
SAPs. Contrary to IMF mandates, the governments of these countries played a major 
role in all aspects of development. They instituted high tariffs, let state-owned industries 
flourish, invested in education and health, and adopted trade liberalization after 
strengthening their industries.  The U.S., Western Europe and Japan maintained tightly 
shut financial markets until the 1970's, ensuring that their markets had ample time to 
develop and withstand any outside competition.   
The need for an activist state for under developed economies like SSAs is made all the 
more necessary if the goal is economic development rather than a mere revival of 
economic growth. 
The difference between economic development and economic growth is easily brought 
home by noting that a country like Botswana has had phenomenal rates of economic 
growth over the past 15 years and has a per capita income almost twice that of 
Zimbabwe yet the latter with much lower rates of economic growth remains more 
`developed' in terms of its technological capacities and clusters than the former.  
Thus something is missing in Botswana's development strategy, which is factor-driven 
(diamonds, livestock and copper) and as free and open as any SAP economy can be and 
this is the creative role of the state, to shift the economy from a factor-driven one into 
an investment-driven one based on higher order comparative advantage requirements. 
Thus, in the stage of factor-driven development and underdevelopment, a dirigist state 
is needed for the following reasons:  
- To foster the development of domestic technological clusters and capacities which can 
act as gravitational growth poles in economic and spatial terms; 
- To guide domestic and foreign investment into activities leading to the development of 
technological capacities in higher order comparative advantage, particularly strategic 
industries relying on modern technology, with increasing returns and economies of 
scale, with positive externalities and spill-overs to other firms, industries and sectors, 
and with the ability to develop home demand; 
- To facilitate the acquisition of foreign technology in the desired strategic industries, 
and to assist in the penetration of foreign markets; 
- To develop and enhance physical and human capital in a manner facilitating the 
development of strategic industries; 
- To provide supply-side and demand-side incentives to encourage the growth of 
strategic industries with the potential to spear-head an investment driven economy; and 
-  To mobilise savings, and regulate the allocation of investment funds towards strategic 
industries.  
All of the foregoing considerations suggest that SAPs, by relying on the private sector 
as the presumed engine of growth, while simultaneously trimming the state of its 
potential role in guiding and directing the economy, are a sure recipe for stagnation and 
being stuck in the factor-driven stage. 
 
V. Lessons for Ethiopia and Considerations to be taken in formulating 
development strategy  
The discussion described in this paper on the proactive role of the government in the 
economic success of the NICs in general and the Korean experience in particular is 
highly interesting since it may also provide lessons to Ethiopia and other Sub Saharan 
Africa countries. The response of the interventionists to the common neoliberal view 
concerning the role of the government versus the market has resulted in more explicit 
evidence to a number of important aspects in the process of economic development. 
In this regard, Ethiopia and other SSA countries can draw important lessons from the 
Korean experience, in this particular point I will focus on Some lessons relevant to the 
statist approach; guided by a dirigist developmentalist state and highlight considerations 
need to be taken in formulating broad based development strategy. Before taking this 
issue, I will briefly introduce the background history of the economy and the role of the 
state focusing on the current development strategies in the Ethiopian experience. 
1. An overview of the Ethiopian development experience  
With a total area of 1,097,000 square kilometers and a population of about 65 million, 
Ethiopia stands as the fourth largest in size and the second populous country in Sub-
Saharan Africa. It is land-locked, lies in the northeast corner of Africa.  
As in most developing countries, agriculture is the main stay of the economy. It accounts 
for about 50% of the GDP, more than 90 % of the foreign export earnings and engages 
over 85%of the population. Manufacturing forms only a minor part of the Ethiopian 
economy. The country has one of the lowest exports per capita in the world; coffee 
accounts for a large portion of merchandise exports.  
Given the country's agriculture-centered economy, Ethiopia is particularly vulnerable to 
the adverse effects of fluctuations in commodity prices (especially coffee), and drought, 
which is frequent. Famine resulting from failure of the rains is a frequent threat for 
millions of Ethiopians. 
Meanwhile, The turn of the millennium finds Ethiopia, one of the oldest continuous 
civilizations in the world, as one of the most destitute of nations, in all possible 
dimensions. At USD 116, Ethiopia's real per capita GDP is among the lowest in the world 
and only about one fifth of the Sub-Sahara African (SSA) average.  
Since the mid-1970s the Ethiopian economy has undergone two major shifts in policies. 
The first occurred in 1975, when the Imperial government (who had ruled since 1930-
1974) was overthrown by a group of military officers known as the Derg. The Derg 
replaced mainly liberal policies of the Imperial era with a centralized socialist regime that 
discouraged a market economy and private property. Land and medium-size and large 
enterprises were nationalized. Prohibitive tariffs, extensive quotas, and complicated 
licensing procedures restricted foreign trade. Manufactured goods were rationed. Small 
farmers were forced to join cooperatives and to deliver grain to a government-marketing 
agency.  
The performance of the economy between 1974 and 1991 showed a dismal picture. Real 
GDP growth, after averaging 4 per cent per annum for 10 years before 1974 fell to about 
1.5 per cent in 1974-91. In contrast, population growth picked up from 2.6 per cent to 
about 3 percent, rendering a continuous fall in per capita income and worsening living 
conditions. The macroeconomic balances were also consistent in describing the situation: 
low gross domestic saving averaging between 0 and 7.5 per cent of the GDP, low level of 
capital formation, inflation reached its peak between 1989/90 and 1990/91, averaging 21 
per cent, and the current account deficit, financed mainly from external sources grew to 
unsustainable level with mounting debt of about 4 billion USD (excluding military 
related credit) by 1992. The growing deficits in the Government budgets and balance of 
payments as well as the increase in external debts servicing ratio further created 
constraints in the national capacity to improve the situation. 
A combination of factors explains the recorded poor economic performance, including 
economic mismanagement, severe fluctuations in weather conditions and excessive 
military outlays diverting resources away from productive use. To sum-up, Ethiopia's 
economic performance has been constrained by: Overall economic structural problems 
attributed to the wrong economic policy pursued by the previous regimes; Protracted civil 
war: Recurrent drought, and Low level technology. 
These policies, combined with the political repression, led to civil conflict. The conflict 
ended with the downfall of the Derg and the assumption of power by the Ethiopian 
People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) in 1991. 
Since the end of the civil war in 1991 the EPRDF established the transitional government 
of Ethiopia (TGE). The TGE mainly focused on reorienting the economy through market 
reforms, including a structural adjustment programs.  
Since 1992, under the auspices of the WB and the IMF structural adjustment programme 
(SAP), a range of reforms has been implemented. As a result the state’s direct role in 
economic activity has declined. Tariffs have been cut, quota constraints relaxed, licensing 
procedures simplified, foreign exchange controls eased, compulsory cooperative 
membership and grain delivery discontinued, and privatization begun. The government 
has also adopted agriculture-led industrialization as a central plank of its development 
programme, with a focus on productivity growth on small farms and labour-intensive 
industrialization. 
These reforms, combined with peace and favourable weather conditions for most of the 
past decade, have shown positive trends. During 1992–2001 real GDP growth averaged 
6% a year. Exports grew by about 5% a year, though there was considerable volatility 
across years. Annual inflation averaged about 4%. And by 2000/01 investments had risen 
to 16% of GDP. These outcomes are much better than those in 1975–91. However, 
Ethiopia still remains one of the world’s poorest countries. About a decade has elapsed 
since the implementation of the SAP however, the expected result of improved the 
country’s competitiveness position could not be attained. The structure of the economy 
remains largely unchanged, with rain fed agriculture generating nearly half of GDP, more 
than 85% of employment, and almost all exports. The country remains dependent on a 
few primary exports that suffer from deteriorating terms of trade, resulting in volatile 
export earnings. Growth is also constrained by heavy external debt. And the recent war 
with Eritrea did not help matters. Moreover, income inequality appears to have increased 
in both rural and urban Ethiopia. Urban unemployment has grown and, perhaps due to 
that, urban poverty has raised.  
2. Impediments for developmental state in Ethiopia 
After the fall of the communist regime in 1991, the new transitional government have 
ushered in a new era of radical transformation in both political and economic spheres in 
the country's recent history. 
The political transformation ‘consisted mainly of changing the unitary state into a federal 
system, one-party system in to a multi-party system, the command economy into a 
market economy, and instituting human rights buttressed up by an independent judiciary. 
Indeed, a new order of state and society was launched in the country.’ (Report by the 
Government of the FDRE at the GCA Economic Committee Meeting, August 1996). 
In the economic sphere, the transitional government, soon after its establishment, 
launched a new economic policy, which represented a radical departure from the past. 
The essence of the new economic policy became the transformation of the command 
economy inherited from the previous regime into a functioning market-based economy. 
‘The emphasis was to dismantle the Byzantine labyrinth of perverse state intervention 
and to limit the role of the state in economic activity. The systematic reduction in the role 
of the public sector in productive activities was to be undertaken in favour of the 
expansion and deepening of the private sector.’ (Ethiopia: Industrial Development 
Review Series, UNIDO1996). 
In my opinion both the internal and external political and economic factors are the key 
motives to undertake the aforementioned radical transformation that involved cutting 
back the activist role of the state. Briefly, the following two reasons may explain as to 
why Ethiopia hasn’t made a developmental state. 
1. Commitment of the new government to exercise free market economy 
The wrong economic policy pursued by the previous regimes; especially the 17 years 
domination under the military government combined with strong political repression, 
protracted civil war and recurrent drought put the country as the most marginalized and 
destitute nation in the world.  
In the economic arena, the transitional government (TGE) inherited a shattered country. 
As indicated by the TGE, Ethiopia's coffers were empty; moreover, some 7 million 
people were threatened with starvation because of drought and civil war. Economic 
performance statistics reflected this gloomy assessment.  
Thus, to resolve these problems embarking on sweeping changes to moving away from 
centrally planned and destitute economic condition to a better economic standard had 
been mandatory to overturn the gloomy past experience inherited from the previous 
regime.  
Holding this conviction along with the strong need of the citizens to enjoy an enormous 
democratic practice and peace dividend on a new development path, the government 
committed to peace and development and initiated a new economic policy that pursued a 
systemic reduction of the role of the state. It began dismantling the country's command 
economic system and shifted toward a market-oriented economy with emphasis upon 
private initiative. 
2. SAPs as a means to receive external loans  
Meanwhile, since mid 1992, under the auspices of the World Bank and the IMF the new 
government has engaged in massive SAPs. 
As is well known, in the past internal efforts and sufficient domestic resource 
mobilization used to play predominant role for successful economic development. 
Currently, however, whatever domestic efforts are undertaken, they are unlikely to be 
effective unless the rest of the world supports them. Thus, in the current international 
economic order, external financing plays pivotal role in developing countries.  
In this regard, Ethiopia needed new loans to pay its outstanding debts and to meet critical 
domestic needs. The growing deficits in the Government budgets and balance of 
payments as well as the increase in external debts servicing ratio further created 
constraints in the national capacity to improve the situation. The World Bank and IMF 
became key providers of loans to countries that were unable to borrow elsewhere. 
Consequently, Ethiopia remained one of those countries receiving the IMF and the World 
Bank financial and technical assistance.  
To be eligible for structural adjustment loan however, the borrower country is required to 
full fill conditionalities required by the institutions. The conditions attached to these loans 
required Ethiopia and other countries to submit to economic changes that favored "free 
markets."  
It involved cutting back the role of the state and promoting the role of the private sector, 
correcting trade imbalances and government deficits, consequently the institutions cede 
control over the economic decision-making of the country.  
To sum-up, getting market indicators and macroeconomic fundamentals right will not be 
enough. A highly motivated and development oriented activist state is indispensable to 
direct, promote and facilitate the economy in order to bring transformation and allow 
entering in the global economic competition. Thus, following own sense of economic 
direction and programme ownership may ultimately led to impressive results by rising 
cordial relations with internal and external development partners. 
 
3. Lessons for Ethiopia 
To discuss on how to bring competitive and sustained development in the Ethiopian 
economy, we should go far beyond the neo classical way of explaining the experience 
of East Asian countries and the narrowest view of the Structural Adjustment Program 
that underplay the proactive role of the state.  The scope of this paper is limited to the 
economic policy aspect and draws some experiences based on the East Asian in general 
and the Korean experience in particular. The lessons listed below are some that I 
believe can suit to the specificities of the countries situation under the present 
globalized world.  
The most crucial element for successful technological development is education. Human 
capital accumulation was the key factor for East Asian countries’ success. Emphasis 
should be given not only to basic literacy level but also to training the labor force that 
will be useful to industry and to develop capacities in science and technology for future 
development of the Ethiopian economy in the high-tech era and for assimilating and 
upgrading the imported technology.  
The choice of trade policy is also vital to the evolution of industry. The free trade policy 
of structural adjustment program has not end with a good industrial performance as was 
predicted but rather end with exposing infant and diminutive industries to giant external 
predators. For instance, in 2001 several shoe factories in Ethiopia have been reported to 
be closed and most others reduced their labor force due to the cheap Chinese shoes, 
which crossed the free trade boarder of the country. The experience of East Asia, 
however, shows that the more rapid export growth is possible through protection of 
domestic industries until they become matured and competitive. So, export oriented 
policies should be backed by some degree of infant industry protection aimed at nurturing 
the industrial sector and strengthening and sustaining the export sector. 
The government’s role in export promotion through participating in international trade 
fairs and displaying the country’s products, dispatching trade missions to potential 
markets, in finding markets for the country’s products, and preparing trade exhibitions 
and expos and more importantly in participating in business activities where the private 
sector is unable or not interested to invest was also crucial in East Asian success in trade. 
So, what the government of Ethiopia can learn from this is not to retreat from business 
activities but to change its way and aim of intervening in the activities in such a way to 
organize and lead the private sector to the nations goal of achieving a competitive 
economy.  
Other policies such as finance, labor, foreign investment, etc, should be geared towards 
the development of industry, agriculture and technology and to increase the country’s 
competitiveness. 
Selecting Industries to be Promoted: The lesson here is that the state should direct 
private investment into activities that have the highest technological and economic spin-
offs in terms of generating clusters, Technological Capacities, economies of scale, 
increasing returns, and indigenisation of technological capacity through learning-by-
doing. 
Balancing Growth and Development Goals With Equity: The lessons from the NICs, 
especially the dirigist practice of the Korean case clearly indicate that the need for 
economic development and the building of human and open society.  
Establishing a Structure of Incentives (rewards and punishments): In order for the state 
to govern the market, it needs a structure of incentives and disincentives aimed at 
inducing firms to invest in desired activities and to discourage them from others. Indeed, 
a structure of rewards and punishments may be needed.  
The crucial requirement here is that such structures be temporarily targeted to the 
beneficiary to be influenced, or the firm to be penalised and generally refrain from 
being macroeconomic and permanent. Further, policies to reduce the effect of their 
negative consequences have to be incorporated. 
Establishing Consultative Structures: There is a need to ensure that a consensus is 
developed around the desired future course of the economy, the desired future economic 
structure of the economy and the structure of incentives and disincentives. Such a 
consensus can only be brought about through the establishment of consultative 
structures, which involve key partners in the economy (corporations, labour and 
government), and major interest groups in civil society. In this regard, a proper balance 
is needed between a 'hard' and a 'soft' state to ensure compatibility of the statist strategy, 
with democratic precepts, and to safeguard against corruption.  
Indeed, if the state is truly developmentalist along the lines of a statist strategy then its 
legitimacy should really depend on its ability to govern the market effectively in a 
manner that yields tangible economic successes. 
 More knowledge has been obtained concerning the role certain factors play in the 
process of economic development, such as human capital, the capability of the civil 
service, and the political economic relations between the government and lobbies in 
society. It has become clear that in relation to this latter set of factors the East Asian 
countries were different from most other developing countries and that the economic 
success of the East Asian model as compared to economic growth in other regions can 
be at least partly explained by means of these differences.  
4. Conclusion  
The general conclusion of this paper is that "market failure" so prominent in development 
economics is still a problem that warrants government intervention and that since such 
"failures" differ in intensity, scope and location, a selective set of interventions is 
required. The most significant lesson has been the central role played by a 
"developmental state" in the process of development. Thus, it can be noted that in almost 
every one of East Asian cases, government played a far more active role than typically 
envisaged in what has come to be known as the Washington consensus. Governments 
went beyond the conventional prescriptions of sound macro-economic policies, including 
low deficits and inflation. They put markets at the center of their development strategies, 
but they were not loath to intervene in markets, or, to use Robert Wade's expression, to 
"govern markets." The East Asian states set out to create and regulate institutions, which 
promoted savings and helped allocated resources, including scarce investment. They 
promoted investments in infrastructure, human capital, and the advancement of 
technology. 
In this regard, simply deregulating and opening up the private sector does not generate 
sufficient impetus for development if the country is saddled with underdeveloped markets, 
lack of human resources and technology, and low productivity. In order to initiate an 
economy trapped in the vicious circle of low income, low savings, and low technology, 
the role of government is crucial as an external agent imparting order and direction to the 
national economy. 
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